master
1//===-- tsan_platform_linux.cpp -------------------------------------------===//
2//
3// Part of the LLVM Project, under the Apache License v2.0 with LLVM Exceptions.
4// See https://llvm.org/LICENSE.txt for license information.
5// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 WITH LLVM-exception
6//
7//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
8//
9// This file is a part of ThreadSanitizer (TSan), a race detector.
10//
11// Linux- and BSD-specific code.
12//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===//
13
14#include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_platform.h"
15#if SANITIZER_LINUX || SANITIZER_FREEBSD || SANITIZER_NETBSD
16
17#include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common.h"
18#include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_libc.h"
19#include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux.h"
20#include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_platform_limits_netbsd.h"
21#include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_platform_limits_posix.h"
22#include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_posix.h"
23#include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_procmaps.h"
24#include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_stackdepot.h"
25#include "sanitizer_common/sanitizer_stoptheworld.h"
26#include "tsan_flags.h"
27#include "tsan_platform.h"
28#include "tsan_rtl.h"
29
30#include <fcntl.h>
31#include <pthread.h>
32#include <signal.h>
33#include <stdio.h>
34#include <stdlib.h>
35#include <string.h>
36#include <stdarg.h>
37#include <sys/mman.h>
38#if SANITIZER_LINUX
39#include <sys/personality.h>
40#include <setjmp.h>
41#endif
42#include <sys/syscall.h>
43#include <sys/socket.h>
44#include <sys/time.h>
45#include <sys/types.h>
46#include <sys/resource.h>
47#include <sys/stat.h>
48#include <unistd.h>
49#include <sched.h>
50#include <dlfcn.h>
51#if SANITIZER_LINUX
52#define __need_res_state
53#include <resolv.h>
54#endif
55
56#ifdef sa_handler
57# undef sa_handler
58#endif
59
60#ifdef sa_sigaction
61# undef sa_sigaction
62#endif
63
64#if SANITIZER_FREEBSD
65extern "C" void *__libc_stack_end;
66void *__libc_stack_end = 0;
67#endif
68
69#if SANITIZER_LINUX && (defined(__aarch64__) || defined(__loongarch_lp64)) && \
70 !SANITIZER_GO
71# define INIT_LONGJMP_XOR_KEY 1
72#else
73# define INIT_LONGJMP_XOR_KEY 0
74#endif
75
76#if INIT_LONGJMP_XOR_KEY
77#include "interception/interception.h"
78// Must be declared outside of other namespaces.
79DECLARE_REAL(int, _setjmp, void *env)
80#endif
81
82namespace __tsan {
83
84#if INIT_LONGJMP_XOR_KEY
85static void InitializeLongjmpXorKey();
86static uptr longjmp_xor_key;
87#endif
88
89// Runtime detected VMA size.
90uptr vmaSize;
91
92enum {
93 MemTotal,
94 MemShadow,
95 MemMeta,
96 MemFile,
97 MemMmap,
98 MemHeap,
99 MemOther,
100 MemCount,
101};
102
103void FillProfileCallback(uptr p, uptr rss, bool file, uptr *mem) {
104 mem[MemTotal] += rss;
105 if (p >= ShadowBeg() && p < ShadowEnd())
106 mem[MemShadow] += rss;
107 else if (p >= MetaShadowBeg() && p < MetaShadowEnd())
108 mem[MemMeta] += rss;
109 else if ((p >= LoAppMemBeg() && p < LoAppMemEnd()) ||
110 (p >= MidAppMemBeg() && p < MidAppMemEnd()) ||
111 (p >= HiAppMemBeg() && p < HiAppMemEnd()))
112 mem[file ? MemFile : MemMmap] += rss;
113 else if (p >= HeapMemBeg() && p < HeapMemEnd())
114 mem[MemHeap] += rss;
115 else
116 mem[MemOther] += rss;
117}
118
119void WriteMemoryProfile(char *buf, uptr buf_size, u64 uptime_ns) {
120 uptr mem[MemCount];
121 internal_memset(mem, 0, sizeof(mem));
122 GetMemoryProfile(FillProfileCallback, mem);
123 auto meta = ctx->metamap.GetMemoryStats();
124 StackDepotStats stacks = StackDepotGetStats();
125 uptr nthread, nlive;
126 ctx->thread_registry.GetNumberOfThreads(&nthread, &nlive);
127 uptr trace_mem;
128 {
129 Lock l(&ctx->slot_mtx);
130 trace_mem = ctx->trace_part_total_allocated * sizeof(TracePart);
131 }
132 uptr internal_stats[AllocatorStatCount];
133 internal_allocator()->GetStats(internal_stats);
134 // All these are allocated from the common mmap region.
135 mem[MemMmap] -= meta.mem_block + meta.sync_obj + trace_mem +
136 stacks.allocated + internal_stats[AllocatorStatMapped];
137 if (s64(mem[MemMmap]) < 0)
138 mem[MemMmap] = 0;
139 internal_snprintf(
140 buf, buf_size,
141 "==%zu== %llus [%zu]: RSS %zd MB: shadow:%zd meta:%zd file:%zd"
142 " mmap:%zd heap:%zd other:%zd intalloc:%zd memblocks:%zd syncobj:%zu"
143 " trace:%zu stacks=%zd threads=%zu/%zu\n",
144 internal_getpid(), uptime_ns / (1000 * 1000 * 1000), ctx->global_epoch,
145 mem[MemTotal] >> 20, mem[MemShadow] >> 20, mem[MemMeta] >> 20,
146 mem[MemFile] >> 20, mem[MemMmap] >> 20, mem[MemHeap] >> 20,
147 mem[MemOther] >> 20, internal_stats[AllocatorStatMapped] >> 20,
148 meta.mem_block >> 20, meta.sync_obj >> 20, trace_mem >> 20,
149 stacks.allocated >> 20, nlive, nthread);
150}
151
152#if !SANITIZER_GO
153// Mark shadow for .rodata sections with the special Shadow::kRodata marker.
154// Accesses to .rodata can't race, so this saves time, memory and trace space.
155static NOINLINE void MapRodata(char* buffer, uptr size) {
156 // First create temp file.
157 const char *tmpdir = GetEnv("TMPDIR");
158 if (tmpdir == 0)
159 tmpdir = GetEnv("TEST_TMPDIR");
160#ifdef P_tmpdir
161 if (tmpdir == 0)
162 tmpdir = P_tmpdir;
163#endif
164 if (tmpdir == 0)
165 return;
166 internal_snprintf(buffer, size, "%s/tsan.rodata.%d",
167 tmpdir, (int)internal_getpid());
168 uptr openrv = internal_open(buffer, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0600);
169 if (internal_iserror(openrv))
170 return;
171 internal_unlink(buffer); // Unlink it now, so that we can reuse the buffer.
172 fd_t fd = openrv;
173 // Fill the file with Shadow::kRodata.
174 const uptr kMarkerSize = 512 * 1024 / sizeof(RawShadow);
175 InternalMmapVector<RawShadow> marker(kMarkerSize);
176 // volatile to prevent insertion of memset
177 for (volatile RawShadow *p = marker.data(); p < marker.data() + kMarkerSize;
178 p++)
179 *p = Shadow::kRodata;
180 internal_write(fd, marker.data(), marker.size() * sizeof(RawShadow));
181 // Map the file into memory.
182 uptr page = internal_mmap(0, GetPageSizeCached(), PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
183 MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, fd, 0);
184 if (internal_iserror(page)) {
185 internal_close(fd);
186 return;
187 }
188 // Map the file into shadow of .rodata sections.
189 MemoryMappingLayout proc_maps(/*cache_enabled*/true);
190 // Reusing the buffer 'buffer'.
191 MemoryMappedSegment segment(buffer, size);
192 while (proc_maps.Next(&segment)) {
193 if (segment.filename[0] != 0 && segment.filename[0] != '[' &&
194 segment.IsReadable() && segment.IsExecutable() &&
195 !segment.IsWritable() && IsAppMem(segment.start)) {
196 // Assume it's .rodata
197 char *shadow_start = (char *)MemToShadow(segment.start);
198 char *shadow_end = (char *)MemToShadow(segment.end);
199 for (char *p = shadow_start; p < shadow_end;
200 p += marker.size() * sizeof(RawShadow)) {
201 internal_mmap(
202 p, Min<uptr>(marker.size() * sizeof(RawShadow), shadow_end - p),
203 PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED, fd, 0);
204 }
205 }
206 }
207 internal_close(fd);
208}
209
210void InitializeShadowMemoryPlatform() {
211 char buffer[256]; // Keep in a different frame.
212 MapRodata(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
213}
214
215#endif // #if !SANITIZER_GO
216
217# if !SANITIZER_GO
218static void ReExecIfNeeded(bool ignore_heap) {
219 // Go maps shadow memory lazily and works fine with limited address space.
220 // Unlimited stack is not a problem as well, because the executable
221 // is not compiled with -pie.
222 bool reexec = false;
223 // TSan doesn't play well with unlimited stack size (as stack
224 // overlaps with shadow memory). If we detect unlimited stack size,
225 // we re-exec the program with limited stack size as a best effort.
226 if (StackSizeIsUnlimited()) {
227 const uptr kMaxStackSize = 32 * 1024 * 1024;
228 VReport(1,
229 "Program is run with unlimited stack size, which wouldn't "
230 "work with ThreadSanitizer.\n"
231 "Re-execing with stack size limited to %zd bytes.\n",
232 kMaxStackSize);
233 SetStackSizeLimitInBytes(kMaxStackSize);
234 reexec = true;
235 }
236
237 if (!AddressSpaceIsUnlimited()) {
238 Report(
239 "WARNING: Program is run with limited virtual address space,"
240 " which wouldn't work with ThreadSanitizer.\n");
241 Report("Re-execing with unlimited virtual address space.\n");
242 SetAddressSpaceUnlimited();
243 reexec = true;
244 }
245
246# if SANITIZER_LINUX
247# if SANITIZER_ANDROID && (defined(__aarch64__) || defined(__x86_64__))
248 // ASLR personality check.
249 int old_personality = personality(0xffffffff);
250 bool aslr_on =
251 (old_personality != -1) && ((old_personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) == 0);
252
253 // After patch "arm64: mm: support ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS." is introduced in
254 // linux kernel, the random gap between stack and mapped area is increased
255 // from 128M to 36G on 39-bit aarch64. As it is almost impossible to cover
256 // this big range, we should disable randomized virtual space on aarch64.
257 if (aslr_on) {
258 VReport(1,
259 "WARNING: Program is run with randomized virtual address "
260 "space, which wouldn't work with ThreadSanitizer on Android.\n"
261 "Re-execing with fixed virtual address space.\n");
262
263 if (personality(old_personality | ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) == -1) {
264 Printf(
265 "FATAL: ThreadSanitizer: unable to disable ASLR (perhaps "
266 "sandboxing is enabled?).\n");
267 Printf("FATAL: Please rerun without sandboxing and/or ASLR.\n");
268 Die();
269 }
270
271 reexec = true;
272 }
273# endif
274
275 if (reexec) {
276 // Don't check the address space since we're going to re-exec anyway.
277 } else if (!CheckAndProtect(false, ignore_heap, false)) {
278 // ASLR personality check.
279 // N.B. 'personality' is sometimes forbidden by sandboxes, so we only call
280 // this as a last resort (when the memory mapping is incompatible and TSan
281 // would fail anyway).
282 int old_personality = personality(0xffffffff);
283 bool aslr_on =
284 (old_personality != -1) && ((old_personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) == 0);
285
286 if (aslr_on) {
287 // Disable ASLR if the memory layout was incompatible.
288 // Alternatively, we could just keep re-execing until we get lucky
289 // with a compatible randomized layout, but the risk is that if it's
290 // not an ASLR-related issue, we will be stuck in an infinite loop of
291 // re-execing (unless we change ReExec to pass a parameter of the
292 // number of retries allowed.)
293 VReport(1,
294 "WARNING: ThreadSanitizer: memory layout is incompatible, "
295 "possibly due to high-entropy ASLR.\n"
296 "Re-execing with fixed virtual address space.\n"
297 "N.B. reducing ASLR entropy is preferable.\n");
298
299 if (personality(old_personality | ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) == -1) {
300 Printf(
301 "FATAL: ThreadSanitizer: encountered an incompatible memory "
302 "layout but was unable to disable ASLR (perhaps sandboxing is "
303 "enabled?).\n");
304 Printf(
305 "FATAL: Please rerun with lower ASLR entropy, ASLR disabled, "
306 "and/or sandboxing disabled.\n");
307 Die();
308 }
309
310 reexec = true;
311 } else {
312 Printf(
313 "FATAL: ThreadSanitizer: memory layout is incompatible, "
314 "even though ASLR is disabled.\n"
315 "Please file a bug.\n");
316 DumpProcessMap();
317 Die();
318 }
319 }
320# endif // SANITIZER_LINUX
321
322 if (reexec)
323 ReExec();
324}
325# endif
326
327void InitializePlatformEarly() {
328 vmaSize =
329 (MostSignificantSetBitIndex(GET_CURRENT_FRAME()) + 1);
330#if defined(__aarch64__)
331# if !SANITIZER_GO
332 if (vmaSize != 39 && vmaSize != 42 && vmaSize != 48) {
333 Printf("FATAL: ThreadSanitizer: unsupported VMA range\n");
334 Printf("FATAL: Found %zd - Supported 39, 42 and 48\n", vmaSize);
335 Die();
336 }
337#else
338 if (vmaSize != 48) {
339 Printf("FATAL: ThreadSanitizer: unsupported VMA range\n");
340 Printf("FATAL: Found %zd - Supported 48\n", vmaSize);
341 Die();
342 }
343#endif
344#elif SANITIZER_LOONGARCH64
345# if !SANITIZER_GO
346 if (vmaSize != 47) {
347 Printf("FATAL: ThreadSanitizer: unsupported VMA range\n");
348 Printf("FATAL: Found %zd - Supported 47\n", vmaSize);
349 Die();
350 }
351# else
352 if (vmaSize != 47) {
353 Printf("FATAL: ThreadSanitizer: unsupported VMA range\n");
354 Printf("FATAL: Found %zd - Supported 47\n", vmaSize);
355 Die();
356 }
357# endif
358#elif defined(__powerpc64__)
359# if !SANITIZER_GO
360 if (vmaSize != 44 && vmaSize != 46 && vmaSize != 47) {
361 Printf("FATAL: ThreadSanitizer: unsupported VMA range\n");
362 Printf("FATAL: Found %zd - Supported 44, 46, and 47\n", vmaSize);
363 Die();
364 }
365# else
366 if (vmaSize != 46 && vmaSize != 47) {
367 Printf("FATAL: ThreadSanitizer: unsupported VMA range\n");
368 Printf("FATAL: Found %zd - Supported 46, and 47\n", vmaSize);
369 Die();
370 }
371# endif
372#elif defined(__mips64)
373# if !SANITIZER_GO
374 if (vmaSize != 40) {
375 Printf("FATAL: ThreadSanitizer: unsupported VMA range\n");
376 Printf("FATAL: Found %zd - Supported 40\n", vmaSize);
377 Die();
378 }
379# else
380 if (vmaSize != 47) {
381 Printf("FATAL: ThreadSanitizer: unsupported VMA range\n");
382 Printf("FATAL: Found %zd - Supported 47\n", vmaSize);
383 Die();
384 }
385# endif
386# elif SANITIZER_RISCV64
387 // the bottom half of vma is allocated for userspace
388 vmaSize = vmaSize + 1;
389# if !SANITIZER_GO
390 if (vmaSize != 39 && vmaSize != 48) {
391 Printf("FATAL: ThreadSanitizer: unsupported VMA range\n");
392 Printf("FATAL: Found %zd - Supported 39 and 48\n", vmaSize);
393 Die();
394 }
395# else
396 if (vmaSize != 48) {
397 Printf("FATAL: ThreadSanitizer: unsupported VMA range\n");
398 Printf("FATAL: Found %zd - Supported 48\n", vmaSize);
399 Die();
400 }
401# endif
402# endif
403
404# if !SANITIZER_GO
405 // Heap has not been allocated yet
406 ReExecIfNeeded(false);
407# endif
408}
409
410void InitializePlatform() {
411 DisableCoreDumperIfNecessary();
412
413 // Go maps shadow memory lazily and works fine with limited address space.
414 // Unlimited stack is not a problem as well, because the executable
415 // is not compiled with -pie.
416#if !SANITIZER_GO
417 {
418# if SANITIZER_LINUX && (defined(__aarch64__) || defined(__loongarch_lp64))
419 // Initialize the xor key used in {sig}{set,long}jump.
420 InitializeLongjmpXorKey();
421# endif
422 }
423
424 // We called ReExecIfNeeded() in InitializePlatformEarly(), but there are
425 // intervening allocations that result in an edge case:
426 // 1) InitializePlatformEarly(): memory layout is compatible
427 // 2) Intervening allocations happen
428 // 3) InitializePlatform(): memory layout is incompatible and fails
429 // CheckAndProtect()
430# if !SANITIZER_GO
431 // Heap has already been allocated
432 ReExecIfNeeded(true);
433# endif
434
435 // Earlier initialization steps already re-exec'ed until we got a compatible
436 // memory layout, so we don't expect any more issues here.
437 if (!CheckAndProtect(true, true, true)) {
438 Printf(
439 "FATAL: ThreadSanitizer: unexpectedly found incompatible memory "
440 "layout.\n");
441 Printf("FATAL: Please file a bug.\n");
442 DumpProcessMap();
443 Die();
444 }
445
446#endif // !SANITIZER_GO
447}
448
449#if !SANITIZER_GO
450// Extract file descriptors passed to glibc internal __res_iclose function.
451// This is required to properly "close" the fds, because we do not see internal
452// closes within glibc. The code is a pure hack.
453int ExtractResolvFDs(void *state, int *fds, int nfd) {
454#if SANITIZER_LINUX && !SANITIZER_ANDROID
455 int cnt = 0;
456 struct __res_state *statp = (struct __res_state*)state;
457 for (int i = 0; i < MAXNS && cnt < nfd; i++) {
458 if (statp->_u._ext.nsaddrs[i] && statp->_u._ext.nssocks[i] != -1)
459 fds[cnt++] = statp->_u._ext.nssocks[i];
460 }
461 return cnt;
462#else
463 return 0;
464#endif
465}
466
467// Extract file descriptors passed via UNIX domain sockets.
468// This is required to properly handle "open" of these fds.
469// see 'man recvmsg' and 'man 3 cmsg'.
470int ExtractRecvmsgFDs(void *msgp, int *fds, int nfd) {
471 int res = 0;
472 msghdr *msg = (msghdr*)msgp;
473 struct cmsghdr *cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(msg);
474 for (; cmsg; cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR(msg, cmsg)) {
475 if (cmsg->cmsg_level != SOL_SOCKET || cmsg->cmsg_type != SCM_RIGHTS)
476 continue;
477 int n = (cmsg->cmsg_len - CMSG_LEN(0)) / sizeof(fds[0]);
478 for (int i = 0; i < n; i++) {
479 fds[res++] = ((int*)CMSG_DATA(cmsg))[i];
480 if (res == nfd)
481 return res;
482 }
483 }
484 return res;
485}
486
487// Reverse operation of libc stack pointer mangling
488static uptr UnmangleLongJmpSp(uptr mangled_sp) {
489#if defined(__x86_64__)
490# if SANITIZER_LINUX
491 // Reverse of:
492 // xor %fs:0x30, %rsi
493 // rol $0x11, %rsi
494 uptr sp;
495 asm("ror $0x11, %0 \n"
496 "xor %%fs:0x30, %0 \n"
497 : "=r" (sp)
498 : "0" (mangled_sp));
499 return sp;
500# else
501 return mangled_sp;
502# endif
503#elif defined(__aarch64__)
504# if SANITIZER_LINUX
505 return mangled_sp ^ longjmp_xor_key;
506# else
507 return mangled_sp;
508# endif
509#elif defined(__loongarch_lp64)
510 return mangled_sp ^ longjmp_xor_key;
511#elif defined(__powerpc64__)
512 // Reverse of:
513 // ld r4, -28696(r13)
514 // xor r4, r3, r4
515 uptr xor_key;
516 asm("ld %0, -28696(%%r13)" : "=r" (xor_key));
517 return mangled_sp ^ xor_key;
518#elif defined(__mips__)
519 return mangled_sp;
520# elif SANITIZER_RISCV64
521 return mangled_sp;
522# elif defined(__s390x__)
523 // tcbhead_t.stack_guard
524 uptr xor_key = ((uptr *)__builtin_thread_pointer())[5];
525 return mangled_sp ^ xor_key;
526# else
527# error "Unknown platform"
528# endif
529}
530
531#if SANITIZER_NETBSD
532# ifdef __x86_64__
533# define LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT 6
534# else
535# error unsupported
536# endif
537#elif defined(__powerpc__)
538# define LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT 0
539#elif SANITIZER_FREEBSD
540# ifdef __aarch64__
541# define LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT 1
542# else
543# define LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT 2
544# endif
545#elif SANITIZER_LINUX
546# ifdef __aarch64__
547# define LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT 13
548# elif defined(__loongarch__)
549# define LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT 1
550# elif defined(__mips64)
551# define LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT 1
552# elif SANITIZER_RISCV64
553# define LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT 13
554# elif defined(__s390x__)
555# define LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT 9
556# else
557# define LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT 6
558# endif
559#endif
560
561uptr ExtractLongJmpSp(uptr *env) {
562 uptr mangled_sp = env[LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT];
563 return UnmangleLongJmpSp(mangled_sp);
564}
565
566#if INIT_LONGJMP_XOR_KEY
567// GLIBC mangles the function pointers in jmp_buf (used in {set,long}*jmp
568// functions) by XORing them with a random key. For AArch64 it is a global
569// variable rather than a TCB one (as for x86_64/powerpc). We obtain the key by
570// issuing a setjmp and XORing the SP pointer values to derive the key.
571static void InitializeLongjmpXorKey() {
572 // 1. Call REAL(setjmp), which stores the mangled SP in env.
573 jmp_buf env;
574 REAL(_setjmp)(env);
575
576 // 2. Retrieve vanilla/mangled SP.
577 uptr sp;
578#ifdef __loongarch__
579 asm("move %0, $sp" : "=r" (sp));
580#else
581 asm("mov %0, sp" : "=r" (sp));
582#endif
583 uptr mangled_sp = ((uptr *)&env)[LONG_JMP_SP_ENV_SLOT];
584
585 // 3. xor SPs to obtain key.
586 longjmp_xor_key = mangled_sp ^ sp;
587}
588#endif
589
590extern "C" void __tsan_tls_initialization() {}
591
592void ImitateTlsWrite(ThreadState *thr, uptr tls_addr, uptr tls_size) {
593 // Check that the thr object is in tls;
594 const uptr thr_beg = (uptr)thr;
595 const uptr thr_end = (uptr)thr + sizeof(*thr);
596 CHECK_GE(thr_beg, tls_addr);
597 CHECK_LE(thr_beg, tls_addr + tls_size);
598 CHECK_GE(thr_end, tls_addr);
599 CHECK_LE(thr_end, tls_addr + tls_size);
600 // Since the thr object is huge, skip it.
601 const uptr pc = StackTrace::GetNextInstructionPc(
602 reinterpret_cast<uptr>(__tsan_tls_initialization));
603 MemoryRangeImitateWrite(thr, pc, tls_addr, thr_beg - tls_addr);
604 MemoryRangeImitateWrite(thr, pc, thr_end, tls_addr + tls_size - thr_end);
605}
606
607// Note: this function runs with async signals enabled,
608// so it must not touch any tsan state.
609int call_pthread_cancel_with_cleanup(int (*fn)(void *arg),
610 void (*cleanup)(void *arg), void *arg) {
611 // pthread_cleanup_push/pop are hardcore macros mess.
612 // We can't intercept nor call them w/o including pthread.h.
613 int res;
614 pthread_cleanup_push(cleanup, arg);
615 res = fn(arg);
616 pthread_cleanup_pop(0);
617 return res;
618}
619#endif // !SANITIZER_GO
620
621#if !SANITIZER_GO
622void ReplaceSystemMalloc() { }
623#endif
624
625#if !SANITIZER_GO
626#if SANITIZER_ANDROID
627// On Android, one thread can call intercepted functions after
628// DestroyThreadState(), so add a fake thread state for "dead" threads.
629static ThreadState *dead_thread_state = nullptr;
630
631ThreadState *cur_thread() {
632 ThreadState* thr = reinterpret_cast<ThreadState*>(*get_android_tls_ptr());
633 if (thr == nullptr) {
634 __sanitizer_sigset_t emptyset;
635 internal_sigfillset(&emptyset);
636 __sanitizer_sigset_t oldset;
637 CHECK_EQ(0, internal_sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &emptyset, &oldset));
638 thr = reinterpret_cast<ThreadState*>(*get_android_tls_ptr());
639 if (thr == nullptr) {
640 thr = reinterpret_cast<ThreadState*>(MmapOrDie(sizeof(ThreadState),
641 "ThreadState"));
642 *get_android_tls_ptr() = reinterpret_cast<uptr>(thr);
643 if (dead_thread_state == nullptr) {
644 dead_thread_state = reinterpret_cast<ThreadState*>(
645 MmapOrDie(sizeof(ThreadState), "ThreadState"));
646 dead_thread_state->fast_state.SetIgnoreBit();
647 dead_thread_state->ignore_interceptors = 1;
648 dead_thread_state->is_dead = true;
649 *const_cast<u32*>(&dead_thread_state->tid) = -1;
650 CHECK_EQ(0, internal_mprotect(dead_thread_state, sizeof(ThreadState),
651 PROT_READ));
652 }
653 }
654 CHECK_EQ(0, internal_sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oldset, nullptr));
655 }
656 return thr;
657}
658
659void set_cur_thread(ThreadState *thr) {
660 *get_android_tls_ptr() = reinterpret_cast<uptr>(thr);
661}
662
663void cur_thread_finalize() {
664 __sanitizer_sigset_t emptyset;
665 internal_sigfillset(&emptyset);
666 __sanitizer_sigset_t oldset;
667 CHECK_EQ(0, internal_sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &emptyset, &oldset));
668 ThreadState* thr = reinterpret_cast<ThreadState*>(*get_android_tls_ptr());
669 if (thr != dead_thread_state) {
670 *get_android_tls_ptr() = reinterpret_cast<uptr>(dead_thread_state);
671 UnmapOrDie(thr, sizeof(ThreadState));
672 }
673 CHECK_EQ(0, internal_sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oldset, nullptr));
674}
675#endif // SANITIZER_ANDROID
676#endif // if !SANITIZER_GO
677
678} // namespace __tsan
679
680#endif // SANITIZER_LINUX || SANITIZER_FREEBSD || SANITIZER_NETBSD